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motive which lost in competition to George Stephenson's "Rocket." He also developed screw propellers and marine steam engines and, in 1837, using a boat with two propellers, towed an Admiralty barge at a speed of ten knots. The Admiralty dismissed his device as impractical in a decision that led a British naval historian to comment, "Never, had Ericsson construct an iron boat "with submerged wheels" (i.e., propellers) and a semicylindrical engine which was sent to America for use on the Delaware and Raritan Canal.9
to America in 1841 on Captain Mallett's "John Taylor," and it was carried on the bill of lading as a hydraulic tube.15 The above account, based on Ericsson's and Ogden's statements, conflicts with the tradition that this was the "Ericsson gun" that he designed and brought to America. The gun was a joint effort and did not spring from Ericsson's mind full blown but grew out of consultation and collaboration with other people of appropriate technical background. Of the four men involved, Ericsson and Ogden had considerable knowledge of the properties of wrought iron stemming from their work in the design of steam engines; William Young was a gunfounder, while Stockton, and possibly Ericsson, had experience in handling and using naval ordnance.
Stockton, having made his arrangements, returned to America, where, in the spring of 1840, he proposed that Ericsson's steam machinery be installed in the "Raritan," a frigate of about 1,700 tons that was then under construction. The navy commisisoners rejected this proposal but maintained that they were not declining a trial of the machinery in a different manner and on a smaller scale.l1 Stockton then argued that he intended to install guns that could not be used advantageously on a small vessel and was again rebuffed by the commissioners, who suggested that Stockton participate in determining the "comparative capacity" of the guns before a vessel was built for their use. Hunt and gunner Robert S. King, of the "Princeton" crew, testified that Ericsson had examined the gun after proof shots were fired.49
The extent of Ericsson's participation in the original decision to order the gun and in its design is unknown. However, he did make the drawings, supervise the boring, and examine the piece after it was prooftested. He as well as Stockton must have believed that its strength was sufficient. * * * While this gun was under construction the "Princeton" was completed, and on October 17, 1843, having taken on her crew the previous day, she proceeded down the Delaware to New York.50 When returning, she outdistanced the steamer "'Great Western" in a race in which both ships used sails and steam. Against flood tide, the "Princeton" had required one hour and thirty-one minutes to go from Castle Garden to Sandy Hook Point, more than twenty-one miles. Thus she had a speed of more than fourteen miles per hour (about twelve knots), and Stockton boasted that she was "the fastest sea-going steamer in the (Fig. 4) .
The forging had been made by laying up a fagot from thirty iron bars, each of which was four inches square and about eight and one-half feet long. These were welded together and rounded into a shaft of twenty to twenty-one inches in diameter, using a seven-and-one-halfton hammer.87 As Talcott had predicted, the welding had indeed been inadequate, for the form of the original bars could still be detected in the fragment, while scales of iron oxide nearly penetrated the body.
Other deficiencies were more serious than poor welding in the forging proper. As Ogden had testified, bands were welded on the American gun, whereas those on the English gun had been shrunk on.88
In terms of modern metallurgical practice, this use of welded bands was a gross error in design. Shrunk-on bands would have served as crack arrestors, whereas welded bands permitted any cracks to enlarge.89 Other weaknesses resulted from the method of fabrication. Iron segments, usually large enough to reach one-third of the way around, were welded on the forging in two strata, and the breech was thus built Ward and Company readily admitted that their hammer was not heavy enough to work such a mass as they had forged and added, "No hammer at present known could affect it much."92 The committee found that the iron had lost nearly half its strength; that is, drawing fragments of the metal down with a hammer increased their strength from thirty-four thousand to sixty thousand pounds per square inch. Moreover, the crystalline structure at the fracture varied from fine grains to coarse crystals, one of which was three-quarters of an inch long and one-half inch wide.93
Even before the Franklin Institute had completed its analysis, the ordnance officers in Washington were conjecturing that prolonged heating had weakened the iron. Talcott, in a report on wrought-iron guns that he prepared following the tragedy, included a generalized statement to this effect.94 Ward, in his private correspondence, was more definite but stopped short of certainty.95 The Franklin Institute was positive and recommended that no more guns of this design should be obtained.9 In all fairness, however, it must be pointed out that even twenty years later there was some disagreement as to whether prolonged heating and inadequate working did in fact weaken wrought A number of conclusions, some of them pertinent to contemporary naval research and development procedures, emerge from the study of the "Peacemaker" episode:
1. Most obvious, the proof-testing of the "Peacemaker" was inadequate to determine the gun's life and strength, even though the evidence given at the Court of Inquiry indicated that its proving, despite irregularities, was in keeping with existing navy practice.
2. Only slightly less apparent, the tragedy might have been avoided if Stockton had been able to examine objectively the product of his labors and had exercised normal prudence in exposing his guests.
3. Stockton's consultants and associates were equally enthusiastic and uncritical in their support of his endeavors. Thus a wide consensus was built up in favor of the endeavor, enabling him to ignore such sound criticism as was made, notably that of Talcott.
4. Stockton's ability to proceed with his demonstrations, despite doubts of the ordnance officers, stemmed from his political support.-His efforts to strengthen this support transformed an accident into a national tragedy.
5. At the same time, this tragedy militated against the acceptance of sound technical innovation. There is no way of knowing whether the explosion retarded the acceptance of propeller-driven ships, but it upset Stockton's and Tyler's plans to modernize the navy. 6. The above five points all revolve around an aspect of governmental administration which is now recognized as crucial. Critical scientific and technological issues often have to be decided by political authority. In the event of conflicts in professional opinion or of uncertainty as to who is qualified to render sound professional advice, decisions may be made without adequate consideration of technological factors. The background to the tragedy aboard the "Princeton" points up the fact that this problem, although perhaps only recently recognized, has been of long duration. It suggests the need for continuing study of the institutions and procedures whereby political authorities have decided issues involving scientific and technological judgments.
7. The historian of technology should find it of great significance that readily available files have provided information concerning an often-told episode which alters greatly the role of the principals, Ericsson and Stockton, from that usually assigned to them. Since any sound understanding of the history of technology and its advances must begin with an accurate understanding of what took place, there appears to be need for additional research in most areas in which accounts of developments are usually taken for granted. Not only is there a continuing need to collect primary records pertaining to various developments, but perhaps even more important is the need for investigating central collection of records where such information may already be found.
